THE New Republic

Go West, Young Communists

Pages 7-8

Solution for Berlin

A Symposium on the Lippmann Proposals

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Destry Rides Again . . . . . *Tom F. Driver*
The False Choice . . . . . *Stanley Kauffmann*

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Washington Wire

The Poorhouse Slice

THE BEST TIFFANY'S can do in advertising in the current *New Yorker* is a mass trade necklace-and-pin set selling for $1,425. Black Starr & Gorham, by contrast, appeals to the more comfortably circumstanced: there is a nice little ring number for $13,025 and a really cute hunk of ice, described as "emerald cut, tapered baguettes" for $39,500. Thrifty, too, for federal tax is included.

Somehow this got us to thinking about the Commerce Department's latest study, "Income Distribution by Size—1955-58." There seems to be a certain amount of inequality in this land of the free. If you consider national income as a pie, the lowest fifth of the population gets a thin, poorhouse slice of it—only 4.8 percent. By contrast the fortunate upper fifth gets just about half the pie —45.3 percent.

That isn't all. If you climb higher into the wealthy classes you find that the upper 5 percent of Americans, according to the study, get over 20 percent of the country's big income. That's the emerald-cut, tapered baguette set. How fortunate we are to live in this best of all possible worlds! Think of the glitter and luster inequality provides! The lower fifth gets something to aspire to, and the upper fifth the tapered baguettes.

Turning Cautious

LAST WEEK, Rep. Carl Vinson (D, Ga.) was quoted as saying of Congressional Democrats: "We have no program and no policy. Our leadership is dead." This didn't upset *The Wall Street Journal* one bit. It cheerfully reported: "After nearly four months of preliminary jockeying, a 'liberal' Congress is turning unexpectedly cautious. . . . The 'liberals', who hoped to have things their own way after last fall's Democratic election sweep, are turning increasingly unhappy over the outlook."

A cartoon in the Republican *New York Herald-Tribune* gleefully taunted the liberals. It showed a floozy in the foreground (labeled "Big Spending Program-Labor Domination") angrily demanding, "What happened to the boy I came to the dance with?" The boy, see, is Congress, and *he's* out in back necking in a car with a nice girl named "Moderation." Lucky for all of us, eh? And finally last week an analytical piece in middle-of-the-road *Newsweek* commented, "Having been handed a great opportunity last November to lead the country and shape the issues for 1960, they (the Democrats) were now in deadly danger of piddling all their advantages away."

But don't be disturbed. Last week Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson went before the US Chamber of Commerce and roused them to enthusiasm by disassociating himself from the "spenders" and saying he was just as determined to balance the budget as Eisenhower.

Johnson failed to explain how he was going to do this while supporting the Democratic Party's social reform program. Incidentally that gimmick he trotted out before the enthusiastic AFL-CIO unemployment conference here last month (remember? — a new commission, to render a report in 60 days) has been quietly shelved in the House. It sounded swell at the time though.

The other Texan, in charge of the House, is Sam Rayburn. After the Democratic victory last November, House liberals demanded that Rayburn change the membership of the conservative Rules Committee bottle neck which traps liberal legislation. Rayburn said it wasn't necessary—he would personally see that the committee behaved. Now the Senate-passed Sparkman housing bill is caught in the Rules Committee. Two Southern Democrats and four conservative Republicans on the Committee have shelved it. Well, Sam?

When House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill they appoint "conferees" who meet, negotiate compromises, and report the revised measure back to their respective houses for approval. The conferees are normally the senior members of the committee handling the bill. Since these senior members are generally conservative Southerners or Republicans this has its preposterous side. For example, liberal Senators last March won a small technical amendment liberalizing a portion of the act to extend unemployment compensation. The Senate approved it, 52-32. But when conferees were picked to argue for it to the House four of the five Senators chosen were *opposed* to the change! Naturally they didn't argue very hard, and the little flower was thrown out after only 20 minutes. Now, we understand, the liberals are starting a new drive to get the rules changed for picking conferees. While it may not get far it is another challenge to Lyndon from Senators within his own party.

Notes

UNIMPORTANT NEWS always seems to be so much more entertaining than important news! The Foreign Ministers' conference starts Sunday and we ought to be writing about that, but instead we keep chuckling over the Luce-Strauss (pronounced straws) confirmation fights. It was for action on these that GOP Senate leader Everett Dirksen pleaded in the unfortunately chosen words: "Why thresh old straws? Why beat an old bag of bones?" Mrs. Luce has had vicissitudes before, including her supposed arsenic poisoning from wallpaper in the Rome embassy. It strikes us as questionable whether the wife of a publisher of such an essentially personal partisan organ as *Time* should be picked as ambassador. However, the curiosity of the affair is that Mrs. Luce suffered principally from a self-inflicted blow — her need for having the last word with Senator Morse. This brought the ultimate row and her husband's advice to resign.

Management and labor in the steel industry have a cozy little arrangement of alternately boosting prices and wages and then blaming the other at the consumers' expense. When the public proposes through the O'Mahoney bill a 60-day advance notice and examination of price increases in monopoly industries, both steel management and labor join ranks in opposition. "Price fixing!" they cry. Yet inevitably as time proceeds, the voice of the third great industrial partner, the consumer, must have greater weight.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *The Ugly American*

SIRS:

HUNTON L. DOWNS' burlesque of *The Ugly American* (*NR*, April 27) is the first perceptive comment I have seen in print on that much over-praised book.

The two authors of *The Ugly American* have taken a superficially attractive

(Continued on page 24)

The Right To Read

TO MOST PEOPLE in this country, censorship is only a wartime memory. Yet within recent weeks, two protests lodged against current censorship of incoming printed matter as foreign propaganda—one in the form of a resolution by the Associated Church Press and one in the form of a court case filed by the American Civil Liberties Union—have provided a rude reminder that it remains a contemporary practice.

Here is how today's censorship works: On arrival, publications are opened for inspection by the Restricted Merchandise Division of the Bureau of Customs, acting on authority of Section L (J) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, supplemented by an opinion of the Attorney General of 1940, which gives the Bureau the right to destroy material whose publisher is not in compliance with the Act. A publisher is non-compliant as an unregistered foreign agent, the agent of a foreign principal, not an American citizen, not in the jurisdiction of the US.

If, upon inspection, the Customs officials regard the contents of the mail as possibly subject to this Act, they turn it over to the Division of Mail Restriction of the Post Office Department. If they judge it to contain propaganda, POD Form 2154-X then goes out to the addressee, announcing the arrival, addressed to him, of "certain publications which contain foreign propaganda as defined in the Foreign Agents Registration Act." He is further informed that "such matter ordinarily would be treated as non-mailable," but a postcard (Form 2153-X) is enclosed, to be returned by the addressee, on which a printed list enables him to declare that the material is "not for dissemination" and that he (a) has ordered, (b) has subscribed to or (c) desires to receive this material. When thus signed for by the addressee, the documents are forwarded, bearing a rubber stamp of one of the three offices—New York, Chicago, San Francisco—where these activities are centralized.

Most, but not all, of the mail held up under this procedure originates in Communist-bloc countries. Two kinds of organizations are frequent addressees: universities and church groups with affiliated memberships on a world-wide basis. According to customs officials, all universities receive publications addressed to them at once; individuals and other organizations are checked to see whether they may be disseminators of political propaganda not registered as foreign agents.

Church sources have recently made two moves to challenge the system. In March, the executive of a prominent interdenominational organization whose members had repeatedly received postcards regarding mailings from church groups abroad, requested an interview with Postmaster General Summerfield to discuss the situation. To date, no interview has materialized; but the holding up of publications abruptly ceased two days after the request was registered.

Then the first week in April, the 40th annual meeting of the Associated Church Press—a group representing some 160 Protestant publications—adopted a resolution expressing "concern and protest over the tendency of

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governmental agencies to hinder the free flow of information between the churches of the US and other nations."

On the secular side, on April 22, the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of Mrs. Helen MacGill Hughes, managing editor of the *American Journal of Sociology,* filed suit against the Chicago postmaster on grounds he had unlawfully detained two magazines mailed to her from Czechoslovakia. (She visited Czechoslovakia last year when her husband was an official US delegate to a Unesco conference in Prague.)

The issue raised by current governmental procedure is clear. While the material held up by the Customs and Post Office Department has ranged widely, some of it coming from friendly countries and some of it containing only strictly factual data, a considerable amount of it does contain propaganda.

For instance, one of the held-up items is the Information Service, published in English and in German by the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Czechoslovakia, of which Dr. J. L. Hromadka is editor. Its February, 1959, issue starts with a communique regarding the Christian Peace Conference meeting to be held April 16-19 in Prague to which Protestant and Orthodox churchmen in Europe and elsewhere are invited. It was "foreseen that the Conference will issue the 'Call of Hiroshima' to a service of repentance and prayer on the 6th of August, the day on which the first atomic bomb in history was dropped."

There follows a declaration of the Czech Protestant churches of which the second article reads:

> Our starting point is the conviction that the whole world—men and women in the East as well as in the West—desire peace. . . .
>
> Gratefully we find that the Soviet Union gave proof of its goodwill by stopping atomic tests. As citizens we are convinced of the sincerity of the peace efforts of the representatives of our state and as members of Christian churches we want to utter this conviction . . . before Christians living in other social systems. . . .

Professor Hromadka's address at the preparatory meeting is reported as making the points:

> 1. The gospel does not stand or fall with any social structure. The Church lived in the period of feudalism, in the period after the end of feudalism and it will live and develop in the new society also.
>
> 2. Communism is no embodiment of evil, no "murderer of souls" ("Seelenmord"), as some people in the West believe. It is our task to demonstrate that this view is mistaken. Communism has grown out of the humanitarian efforts of many philosophers and poets who desired to create a most just and happy society. . . .

Let's agree wholeheartedly that this is propaganda. The question is not whether it is or isn't. The question is, are Americans capable of judging such material for what it is, or must their government do so for them?

A Proposal on Berlin

"EXPERIENCED State Department and Foreign Office officials," reported Drew Middleton in the *New York Times* on May 1, "consider that in the event of Soviet rejection of the Western package Berlin's future may have to be negotiated separately." Soviet notice that the package approach would in fact be rejected had been served before Mr. Middleton's words were dry; but, in any case, the mere thought that the West might *not* have a fall-back proposal for Berlin ready is an alarming one. For the whole Russian position up to now amounts to a rejection of any lumping of the Berlin issue with German reunification and European security. The Soviets are sure to arrive at Geneva on May 11 with proposals addressed as much to key segments of world opinion as to the foreign ministers and with fall-back positions of their own designed accordingly. Thus the West must consider at once what would constitute a desirable settlement and what settlement should be proposed as an earnest of the Western will to ease tensions. Here, perhaps, lies the clincher in the case for the UN trusteeship proposal by Walter Lippmann which is discussed in the symposium beginning on page 9.

"Why Thresh Old Straws?"

ADMIRAL LEWIS L. STRAUSS, whose confirmation as Secretary of Commerce has been hanging fire in the Senate since the opening of the session, has seemed to feel that the opposition to him could primarily be laid at the door of Senators Kefauver and Anderson. Kefauver, as chairman of the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee which investigated the Dixon-Yates contract, and Anderson, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, possibly are the Senators who know Strauss best, and their opposition to his confirmation has an added significance. Yet Strauss is finding that his opposition runs broader and deeper than that. No one believes that he will not be confirmed eventually, but the votes against him will be substantially more numerous than the 11 noes cast against the unfortunate Mrs. Luce. One Strauss opponent counts as many as 30 votes against. If so, this will prove a heavy burden for the Secretary of Commerce.

When Senator Kefauver appeared as a witness against Strauss, Republican members of the Commerce Committee interrupted their colleague so often that it took Kefauver two days to get through his six and a half-page statement. The burden of it was that since the Department of Justice is using the argument that the Dixon-Yates contract is void due to the taint of conflict of interest, Strauss is not entitled to be confirmed until an investigation has cleared Strauss, who Kefauver says was the prime mover behind the contract, of being an "aider

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and abettor" of the conflict of interest. Such an investigation either has not been made or its results have not been revealed to him, Kefauver stated.

Kefauver made a strong point in showing that after Sen. Lister Hill revealed the dual role of Adolphe Wenzell, senior vice president of the First Boston Corporation and a consultant to the Bureau of the Budget, in preparation of the contract, Admiral Strauss took no action either to remove the conflict or cancel the contract, until public opinion, aroused by Senate hearings months later, forced cancellation by the President. Strauss passed this off by saying he was on vacation when Hill made his speech and he didn't remember much about it. Strauss termed the conflict-of-interest "alleged" and said that he still thought the Dixon-Yates contract was a good one. Kefauver was attacking him through innuendoes, he declared.

Committee Republicans were less ruthless with the testimony of Sen. Eugene McCarthy, possibly because it came close to summing up the anti-Strauss position of so many other Senators. McCarthy's objection to Strauss was his demonstrated arrogance toward Congressional committees and the evidence that in his administration of laws Strauss believes that the ends which he conceives good can justify giving Congress the runaround.

Some of the Strauss arrogance glimmered through at the hearing. He had refused to testify as to conversations with the President and his subordinates not as a matter of privilege but due to the separation of powers. He had firmly believed in this concept of government since he was a boy, Strauss insisted. Even if the Attorney General told him to answer such questions, he would not. As a matter of fact, he wouldn't inquire of the Attorney General (the record shows that he did so in the Dixon-Yates investigation). But what, he was asked, if the information sought involved criminality and thus overrode the constitutional privilege? Well then, said the Admiral, stumped for once, he would consult his lawyer.

Who Gets What

THE EXTENT to which rising prices and recession leached away family purchasing power during 1958 is displayed in a study of personal incomes of families and unattached individuals just released by the Department of Commerce. Between 1955 and 1957, advances in personal income average $19 billion a year; the $338 billion total for 1958 represented a rise of only $6 billion from the year before, and most of this amount represented enlarged payments for unemployment compensation and old age insurance.

Since the number of families and unattached individuals grew—the population clock in the foyer of the Commerce Department now ticks off the birth of an American baby every 7½ seconds—family income in dollars, divided among 54 million consumer units in 1958, averaged $6,220, just about what it had been the year before. But when the rise in the cost of living was considered, the purchasing power of this dollar total shrank by about two percent from 1957.

The details of the study shed new light on what incomes are currently received by whom.

For the first time in a number of years, the percentages of families receiving incomes of different sizes failed to change between 1957 and 1958. Previously, a trend toward concentration in the middle brackets had been proceeding fairly rapidly: where, in 1947, 25 percent of the 44.7 million US families had incomes under $2,000, and 38 percent had incomes between $2,000 and $3,999, in 1958 only 14 percent of 54.3 million families were in the under $2,000 group, and only 22 percent in the next higher bracket. Over the same interval, the proportion of families with $4,000-$5,999 rose from 20 to 25 percent, those with $6,000-$7,999 from 9 to 17 percent, and those with $8,000 and over from 8 to 22 percent.

Who are these families? The past decade has seen quite striking changes in their make-up, and also in the way they make their living.

The drop in the family standard of living that comes with retirement shows up prominently in the average age of the head of the family in the various income groups. With all families grouped into fifths according to their income, the median age of the head of the family rose in the two lowest groups between 1948 and 1957, and dropped in the three upper groups; in the lowest fifth, the percent of heads of families who were 65 years old or older mounted from 27.6 to 32.9 percent. The percentage of the lowest-income families that were headed by a woman also went up, from 19.8 to 22.7, while the families so headed in the highest fifth dropped from 6.2 to 3.9 percent. The number of children per family increased in all groups, but the increase grew larger as the family income rose; as a result, a smaller proportion of the nation's children is now to be found in the low income brackets than formerly.

The higher incomes are increasingly obtained by the presence of the wife as well as the husband in the paid labor force: among families with incomes in the top fifth, the number with working wives rose from 30.5 percent in 1948 to 41.2 percent in 1957; in the lowest fifth the change was only from 13.4 to 16 percent.

Most interesting of all is the occupational basis for today's incomes as compared with that of a decade ago. The decline of self-employment, whether as proprietor, professional or farmer, took the percentage of families whose income was derived from that source from 19.2 in 1948 to 13.1 in 1957. Much smaller declines also took place in persons working in domestic service, other service jobs, and laborers, and among those working as craftsmen or operatives. Clerical and sales workers in-

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creased slightly. But the big upward shift was among heads of families employed as salaried professionals, managers and officials—their percentage rose from 9.7 to 13.1 percent.

More Care for Less

A RECENT report on the medical situation of the aged placed before the House Ways and Means Committee by Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Arthur Flemming may rescue the neglected Forand proposal for compulsory hospitalization insurance for old people on social security.

The report outlines, in emotionless detail, the plight of our 15 million old people when faced with rising medical needs and costs, on the one hand, and stationary or declining incomes on the other. Three-fifths of them have incomes of less than $1,000 a year, and only half have saved assets of more than $500. Yet, as a group, persons over 65 years of age use twice as much hospital care as those under 65, and if it were not for financial barriers would undoubtedly use more. Some are helped by voluntary health insurance: in 1957 about 39 percent had some such protection, but much of this was clearly inadequate to meet more than a small part of medical bills. Furthermore, the Flemming report shows, the percentage declines rapidly with advancing age as retired persons use up their maximums, face cancellations or are simply unable to go on paying their premiums.

Can voluntary insurance ever wholly meet this need? This is the crux of arguments over the Forand Bill. Certainly, the proportion of aged with some insurance has increased in recent years, and old people are no longer considered "uninsurable." Reduced doctor bills and special insurance arrangements may help even more in the future. But the inescapable fact remains that old people need more care and can only pay for less: somehow or other the younger members of society must share their burden, or else have them do without the care they need.

In attempting to meet this problem, the Forand Bill is unhappily open to attack both for doing too much and for doing too little. Those who think it does too much see it as the thin end of the dreaded wedge of "socialized medicine." Those who favor the principle of social insurance are concerned that it covers only social security beneficiaries (about seven-tenths of all those now over 65), that only a part of their medical bills will be covered, and existing retirees, who had no chance to contribute during their working lives, will be excluded.

The Forand Bill is admittedly less than a perfect solution to the problems outlined in Secretary Flemming's report, but it does seem to be a step in the right direction. And since no one in five years of discussion has had a better proposal, it would seem reasonable to expect Administration support for it—if it didn't cost money.

Trouble in Mexico

A CLASH between the Left and the Right may be brewing in Mexico amidst rumors of another devaluation of the peso, the rising cost of living, and one of the world's fastest growing populations which demands more than the budget can provide. This spring there have been strikes in the mines and against the nationalized railway system. Federal leaders announced in March that they would hire non-union crews if the strikers were not at their jobs. Amidst the official propaganda depicting the ruling PRI as the paragon of revolutionary virtue, the declaration hit like a thunderbolt from Popocateptl. At the last moment there was a change of plans, but a few days later the newly elected leftist leadership of the Mexican Railway Workers was tossed into jail and the strike broken with federal troops.

Amidst the labor troubles, the conservative-clerical National Action Party surprised the Mexican political world by adopting at its convention a policy of "direct action." As one delegate announced: "Let National Action waste no more time in gaining power by whatever means. We have won the people; now all that remains is to govern." By accepting this view the party faithful had repudiated their policy of pressure for change through ideas and openly challenged the PRI.

At the root of these developments lies a worsening political and economic picture. Harassed by rising costs and ignored by a big business regime, labor has demonstrated increasing unwillingness to sit by and wait for improvement.

The conservatives, meanwhile, have become vocal, condemning openly what they call the radical legislation of recent years, and particularly organized labor, which they feel is coming under Communist domination. An expanding middle class, caught between inflation and fixed incomes, listens with ready ears. Far from the cities, the *sinarquistas*, a falange group, play on the fears of the peasants who have gained little from the program of industrialization.

Local organizations of the PRI have suppressed the protest with violence. The wrath of the PRI descends on every opponent. Until recently the PRI had followed a policy of expediency, placating labor on some occasions and conservatives on others. But judging from its crackdown on the railroad strikers, it may have decided that the sun shines brightest in the conservative camp.

Arab Oil and the US

THE RECENT Arab oil Congress in Cairo came at a moment of substantial oversupply in crude oil—and of a corresponding fall in prices—which might have been, but was not, the occasion for a State Department initiative on oil policy. The US was not formally invited

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because the Department has made it very clear that it considers oil policy in the US case a private business matter: thus the oil companies "represented" the US at Cairo, and Washington was as conspicuously missing as Baghdad at the same time that Venezuela, another non-Arab oil-producing state, was very much in evidence.

The present oversupply of crude oil is the result of the virtually unlimited supplies of the Middle East fields. The rapid expansion of Kuwait's production from 1.2 million barrels two years ago to an expected 2.5 million barrels by the end of the year, coupled with a reduction of US imports due to the recent stringent import quotas, have led to broad price reductions (except in the US). Venezuela and the Middle East face a price war and recognize that they cannot compete with Kuwait oil, the world's cheapest, produced at a cost of less than 1/5 of a cent per gallon. Thus the Cairo Congress, at Venezuela's urging, adopted a statement calling for a producers' cartel with "special machinery to coordinate at a national level the conservation, production and export of oil;" and also made a demand foreshadowed nine months ago in this journal by Bushrod Howard, Jr. (*NR*, Aug. 4, 1958) that "the oil industry be integrated" so that, when prices fall, this does not simply become a bonanza for the major international oil companies, who then use the savings within their own vast distribution and refining operations at the expense of both the producing countries and the consumer. The principal champion of integrated companies, Sheikh Abdullah Tariki, Director General of Oil Affairs in the Saudi Arabian Government, argues that the parent companies of ARAMCO encompass many interests in other countries and thus do not protect Saudi interests.

The conference tabled the proposal that five percent of the oil profits of both the companies and the oil-producing countries be contributed to regional development. This was to be expected so long as the key custodian of Middle East oil wealth, the Sheikh of Kuwait, is investing more than $200 million per year in the London money market. It is British control of Kuwait which gives the West the leverage to break the deadlock of Arab oil politics. But this presupposes a recognition by the Administration that it is proper for the government of a country whose oil industry is a function of private enterprise to have a national policy with regard to the world market. Then it should follow that such a policy be used to exert pressure for international price arbitration, as often discussed in these pages, and financial cooperation with Britain to help underwrite the loss of Kuwait investment capital. The loss of Kuwait itself is only a matter of time. Now the US has a golden opportunity to anticipate this by acting to initiate an oil policy —while time does in fact still remain in Kuwait and while the supply of crude oil remains at high levels which predispose the producer governments to a sweet reasonableness unlikely to endure many more years.

Go West Young Comrades

FROM July 26 to August 4, two of the most active and formidable Communist international front groups—the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS)—will assume the calculated political risk of holding the first "World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship" in a free city beyond the Iron Curtain.

Certain political realities prompted the decision to go to Vienna. From the Communist point of view, the thousands of Western, African and Asian youths who attended the Warsaw Festival in 1955 and the Moscow Festival in 1957 exposed Polish and Soviet citizens to too many Western and non-Communist ideas. By moving the Festival west, the danger of "political contamination" will be limited to the relatively few well-indoctrinated Iron Curtain delegates. Furthermore, the fact that up until now all the Festivals have been held in Soviet-bloc countries has frustrated Communist attempts to gain legitimacy and respectability for the Festivals. And because the severe travel restrictions, imposed when the Festivals took place in Eastern Europe, will not be in effect for a Festival taking place in a neutral country, the sponsors expect many more representatives from the neutral and uncommitted countries to attend.

Having decided on a neutral location, Austria was the logical choice. If the risks involved in holding the Festival outside the Iron Curtain area proved too great, either because of Western counter-pressure or because of the presence of escaped Hungarian refugees in Austria, it would be easy to shift events to nearby Prague, where parallel preparations are reportedly being made. Then, Austria was easily approachable because of the trade and reparations pressures which the Soviet Union can bring to bear on the Austrian Government. And it was well known that Chancellor Raab would adhere to the position that Austria, as a free and uncommitted democracy, had no choice but to allow the Festival to take place.

The reaction in Austria when the government finally gave its permission to the WFDY and IUS, therefore must have been a heavy disappointment to the Festival organizers. The opposition parties in parliament bitterly criticized the government for its decision and forbade their own members to aid the Festival preparations in any way. The Austrian National Union of Students voted not only to boycott the Festival, but also to undertake definite measures against it. All major youth organizations in Austria joined the Union in opposing the Festival. And similarly, throughout the non-Communist world, representative and democratically-elected student and youth groups, such as the US National Student Association and the Young Adult Council, decided to avoid all official connection with the celebration. This opposition has not slowed down the sponsors, however. And a

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growing number of young Americans are realizing the need for sophisticated Western representation.

The significance of the Vienna Festival and the challenge which it represents to the United States may perhaps best be appreciated by understanding the American role in the Sixth World Youth Festival in Moscow. The Department of State was faced with a great dilemma in formulating its policy on that gathering. If it encouraged American participation, that would lend dignity to the Festival. If, on the other hand, the Department discouraged or forbade American participation, the Communists could claim that the US was "an enemy of peace and friendship." Worse still, the vacuum created by such a negative policy would more than likely be filled by "left-wing" Americans, as had been the case previously.

THE Department adopted the negative policy and attempted to discourage, but not forbid, participation. Nevertheless some 160 Americans arrived in Moscow. But for the first time in the history of the Festivals, the majority of the American delegates had little sympathy for the Communist cause. Most of them were there for the sheer curiosity of seeing the Soviet Union at a bargain price. Unfortunately, many were politically unsophisticated. But a handful recognized the unusual opportunity of presenting an honest picture of America and of rebutting the Soviet propaganda. Their experience at the Moscow Festival made clear the need for intelligent, politically sophisticated and articulate Americans to make contact with the 17,000 youths from all over the world who will gather in Vienna. Twice as many Asians and Africans and three times as many Latin Americans as were at Moscow will be in Vienna. And the Soviet-bloc representation which will concentrate on these groups will be smaller and more cohesive than it was in Moscow, and will undoubtedly be selected from among the best indoctrinated and most reliable activists in the Communist orbit.

Since past experience has shown that participation by persons representing organizations or universities will only lend prestige and respectability to the Festival, the State Department is again discouraging such delegations. But as Chester Bowles remarked at a recent conference on exchange of persons: "It is hardly essential for Americans to be official representatives in Vienna. . . ." Individuals participating on a person-to-person basis seems the better alternative, and the State Department has decided not to discourage this type of attendance.

Americans who do decide to take part in the Festival, however, should be fully informed about the United States, its problems and attempted solutions, its foreign and domestic policies. Hubert H. Humphrey, speaking on the Senate floor about the challenge of the Vienna Youth Festival, emphasized that "nothing constitutes a greater obstacle to improving international understanding among individuals than the lack of relevant information." The Senator also cautioned those who attend the Festival to be aware of its true nature and the character of its organizers, the manner in which the meeting will operate and the ways by which participation can be exploited. Already in this country, the International Preparatory Committee (IPC), which has the immediate administrative responsibility for organizing the Vienna Festival, has set up a United States Festival Committee to recruit a 400-man American delegation. Material circulated by these groups indicates that the occasion will be depicted as "a neutral and non-political affair designed to further international understanding by bringing together the youth of all countries in a spirit of good will."

To offset such misleading and distorted information, a group of students and recent university graduates have established an "Independent Service for Information on the Vienna Youth Festival" in College House on Harvard Square, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Most of its sponsors have had considerable experience in domestic and international youth and student affairs. The Service has established contact and liaison with a large number of national youth and student organizations including such groups as the Council on Student Travel, National Young Democrats, National Young Republicans, US National Student Association, World University Service and the Young Adult Council.

The Service's avowed purpose is to "discourage official American participation," but to provide information and background material to Americans who "wish to attend the Vienna meeting in an individual and non-representative capacity." Preparations for the Vienna gathering "will be continually analyzed and reported monthly." In addition, background data on US and world affairs, indications on what may be expected in Vienna, and practical information as to the means of participation in the Festival will be available to those who decide to attend or who might visit the Festival briefly while traveling in Europe.

It is too early to tell what effect the Independent Service may have. But the organization of such a group is an indication that young people in this country are becoming aware of the importance of the Youth Festivals in the Communist propaganda scheme and of the necessity of taking a "new look" at the policy that the United States and other non-Communist countries have adopted toward them in the past.

GEORGE S. ABRAMS
RICHARD J. MEDALIE

Russian language specialist RICHARD J. MEDALIE *and fellow Harvard Law School graduate* GEORGE S. ABRAMS *traveled to the Moscow Youth Fair in the summer of 1957 where they engaged in widely-publicized street-corner conversations in Red Square and Gorky Street, discussed in an earlier article by Mr. Abrams (*NR, *Oct. 14, 1957).*

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Solution for Berlin

Louis J. Halle, C. L. Sulzberger, Hans Morgenthau, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Lowenthal, Terence Prittie, Otto Heinrich v.d. Gablentz give their views on Walter Lippmann's proposals

DURING THE MONTH of March, 1959, Walter Lippmann visited London, Paris, Bonn, Berlin and Rome to talk with leaders in those capitals about the outlook for the forthcoming negotiations with the Russians on the Berlin crisis. On his return Mr. Lippmann set out his analysis of the German situation and his proposal for a solution of the Berlin problem in a series of four newspaper articles. That proposal—in brief—called for recognizing that "German reunification has for the foreseeable future ceased to be practical politics" and that Berlin "must be protected in a special way while Germany remains divided." What is called for, Mr. Lippmann argued, is negotiation of a new statute "in which the future of Berlin is put in trust with the United Nations," and which spells out "the right of access, the conditions of co-existence, the relations between the two Berlins and the two Germanies and the presence of Allied [and] UN token military forces."

Because we believe the Lippmann suggestions merit the most serious consideration, and provide a unique basis for a constructive discussion of the issues confronting the foreign ministers on May 11, *The New Republic* has invited a group of American and European experts on international affairs to comment on his thesis. The views of seven such authorities follow. Other comments will appear in a later issue.

Back to "Normalcy"

WHENEVER the word "normal" occurs in any discussion of the problems that beset society, the prudent reader ought to pick it up and look for what may lie underneath. I know what the doctor means when he prescribes aspirin to bring the patient's temperature back to "normal": "normal" is 98.6° Fahrenheit. But what is the "normal" state of a political society?

Dr. Talleyrand and Dr. Metternich, in 1815, knew what was the "normal" state of France: it was normal for France to be under the rule of its Bourbon kings. The French Revolution and the rule of Napoleon had been "abnormal," like a temperature of 104°. What the doctors did was to "restore" France. In like manner, England went through a period of "abnormality" from the execution of its Stuart king in 1649 to the "Restoration" of 1660. But in neither of these cases was it possible to make the restoration stick. People at last had to change their ideas of what was "normal."

After each of two world wars the Republican Party has identified itself with the restoration of "normalcy" (a word invented by President Harding and quickly taken into the language). What is "normalcy" in such a context? Coming after any violent movement of history, it is always the restoration of the essential *status quo ante*.

Senator Robert Taft typified in American politics the psychology that we all share to some degree: the disposition to regard the world we grew up in as the only "normal" world (however "abnormal" it might seem by other standards). For Senator Taft, General MacArthur, and the other sober right-wing Republicans of their generation this meant the pre-1912 world. That world had suffered a series of violent movements over which the Democrats had presided, leaving us with a legacy of big government, high taxes, unbalanced budgets, and internationalism. The reason why it was so urgent, in 1952, for the Republicans to replace the Democrats in power was because it was so urgent for the country, after such a long experience of "abnormalcy," to get back to "normalcy"—back to 1912. If a temperature of 104° continues long enough, a time will come when it is too late to restore the patient.

How does this apply to postwar Germany?

Germany, Europe, and the whole world went through an experience of peculiar violence in the decade that ended with 1945. It left Europe (and the world) broken in two, the split running right through Germany. This did not represent a settlement. It was a situation that just happened to exist at the moment, and that would be ended as soon as a settlement could be worked out—if not this month then next month. That was fourteen years ago, and for most of these fourteen years it has been evident that the conditions for working out a settlement have not existed.

At first our thinking about the state of Europe was entirely governed by the logic of "normalcy" and "abnormalcy." After every great war the task of the peace-

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CYRUS L. SULZBERGER, *foreign affairs columnist for the* New York Times, *has spent most of the past 20 years covering Europe.*

HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *director of the Institute for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, is now at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.*

PROF. OTTO HEINRICH V. D. GABLENTZ *is the director of the Deutsche Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin.*

HUBERT HUMPHREY, *senior US Senator from Minnesota, heads the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee and served as vice president of the American Political Science Association in 1954.*

TERENCE PRITTIE *reports on West Germany for the* Manchester Guardian *and has contributed frequent dispatches from Bonn to* The New Republic.

makers is conceived to be that of ending the "abnormal" situation by restoring the "normal." This means restoring the map to essentially what it had been in the prewar school-geographies. It does not matter, in these terms, whether Germany's boundary is a few miles farther west or farther east, but there must be one Germany occupying a certain general area on the map. This is the assumption, one may note, not only of non-Germans but of Germans as well, and thereby it gains a degree of validity independent of any other circumstances. In politics, the fact often follows its imagining. People constitute one nation merely because they think of themselves as constituting one nation. This was the basis on which the German nation-state was created in the first place.

We always regard "abnormal" situations as being intolerable in the sense that they cannot be tolerated for long. In this sense a temperature of 104° is intolerable. In this sense we have thought of the existence of the two separate Germanies as intolerable—intolerable because "abnormal." But any student of world history knows that the intolerable is often susceptible of indefinite toleration, and that when it has been tolerated long enough the psychological premises which made it intolerable change. New generations grow up with new conceptions of "normalcy."

Those who say that the continuation of two Germanies is intolerable should remind themselves that there have never been fewer than two. It was never possible, for all Bismarck's skill, to construct the one Germany of which German nationalists since Herder had dreamed. The movement had at last to satisfy itself with two Germanies, one occupying the region south of Bohemia, the other occupying the region north and west of it. We should not allow ourselves to be confused by the fact that the latter came to be called "Germany" while the former was called "Austria." Before 1871 Austria was not less German than Prussia or Saxony or Bavaria. And before 1871 there were many who might have regarded the possible establishment of two separate German nations, instead of one, as intolerable. But, being separate, the two Germanies came to think of themselves as different, and when Hitler undertook the union of the two in 1938 that union seemed neither "normal" nor tolerable to most Austrians and to most of us. If Bavaria had been separate since 1871 we would have felt the same way about any proposed union of it with Germany.

As a resident of Western Europe I think I can say that most Western Europeans, for obvious reasons, do not regard the division of Germany as intolerable. American commentators, however, have rather generally assumed that its continuance must prove intolerable to the Germans themselves, and that when they recovered from the shock of defeat they would be moved by an obsessive nationalistic passion to reconstitute their national unity at any price. East Germany would be to the West Germans what Alsace and Lorraine had been to the French two generations ago, what Ulster is to the Irish of Eire today. This is what we have come to regard as "normal."

But I am not sure. I suspect that we don't appreciate the degree to which the passion of nationalism, which in its engulfing flood spread so much ruin over Europe, has at last ebbed away from the scene of its destruction. Nationalism no longer stirs the people as it did; it is no longer the demon that intoxicates. Europeans, traveling about their continent more and more, cross boundaries constantly, and almost as heedlessly, as Americans cross state boundaries, the border formalities having been largely eliminated. All living together pell-mell as they do, and contemplating the non-European collossi on either side of them, it may be natural for them to feel increasingly that they are all parts of one community.

I do not feel knowledgeable about public opinion in Germany, but in talking with Germans and giving public lectures in Germany I have openly doubted the possibility of German unification, and no one has demurred or seemed particularly troubled. No one has arisen in the question-periods to suggest the prospect was intolerable.

Now Walter Lippmann tells us, with unquestionable authority, that "every responsible European statesman realizes that [the two Germanies] cannot be united within any foreseeable future and under any conditions which are now conceivable." I agree with him fully when he says, further, that "we would be deceiving ourselves if we thought that the division of Germany rests only on

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naked force thwarting the will of Europe and of the Western World. The truth, I believe, is that for a variety of reasons the prolonged division of Germany has very wide support all over Europe, both East and West, and also within Germany itself."

Under these circumstances, a new generation is arising, or will arise, to which the prewar Germany is not "normal" and to which the two postwar Germanies are. Increasingly, West Europe may appear to West Europeans (including Germans) as the unit to which they belong. And the existence of three Germanies may come to seem as "normal" as the prewar existence of two.

There is one poignantly understandable reason why responsible statesmen hesitate to say all this. It is supposed, and in a considerable measure must be true, that East Germans live in the hope of liberation. (Moreover, all that is said about the division of Germany and the captive East Germans has its obvious bearing on the division of Europe and the captive East Europeans.) But this hope for an act of liberation is a false hope that we should hesitate to encourage. The real hope, and I think it substantial, is in a gradual easement of the situation over the years, a liberation by evolution that can only be retarded by too zealous an effort to force it.

This, to my mind, is the historical framework within which the extraordinary situation of Berlin must be considered. Here the facts of geography and history have stood us all on our heads, Communist as well as Westerners, and for the time being we are going to have to make ourselves as secure and comfortable in that position as we can. For it must be accepted as axiomatic—and is widely so accepted in Europe—that even at the cost of some fighting we cannot desert the people of West Berlin who have placed their lives and their liberties in our hands. To do so would inaugurate a train of events that might well cost us our own lives and our own liberties. Here principle and expediency march together.

The technical problems involved in working out the terms of continued freedom for West Berlin could be appalling. But if we and the Russians agree, tacitly or explicitly, in accepting the basic facts of the present situation, and if both sides are concerned (as I think both are) to institute safety-measures, then mutually tolerable terms surely can and will be worked out. If the test of wisdom is met in the first instance, then the test of mere ingenuity can be approached with confidence.

Geneva LOUIS J. HALLE

Freezing the Status Quo

I SHARE a difficulty with Walter Lippmann: like him, I belong to the minority of Western opinion which would prefer a neutral Germany, reunified in freedom under suitable guarantees, to the status quo of German and European partition. Like him, I believe that the official policy of all the Western governments, which insists on a military alliance with Western Germany as the *sine qua non* of European "stability," involves them in the embarrassing contradiction of having to maintain the status quo of partition in order to maintain the alliance, but having to keep protesting that status quo all the time in order to preserve the backing of the West German electorate for that alliance. Yet again like him, I have to answer the question of what policy the Western governments should pursue in the crisis over Berlin, given that their basic addition to the West German alliance, which involves them in that dilemma, persists.

It is in answering that crucial short-term question that I part company with Lippmann. Having explained the dilemma with admirable lucidity, he proceeds to advocate the solution recommended by the British Government—which is to ignore one side of it. I think anybody who cares about these matters must be grateful to Lippmann for having produced what is, to my knowledge at least, the only intelligible and coherent exposition of Mr. Macmillan's policy. But like that policy, Lippmann's exposition seems to me to leave some vital facts out of account.

THE Lippmann-Macmillan thesis is that the West should have the guts to admit that it agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in wishing to preserve the status quo of German and European partition, but that it should sell the symbol of that admission—the recognition of Herr Ulbricht's East German Government as partner in an international settlement—for new Russian and East German pledges which would guarantee the freedom of West Berlin and the safety of its communications under a new international statute. There are, to my mind, three objections to this solution—two immediate and practical, the other long-term and fundamental.

In the first place, Lippmann himself admits that recognition of the East German regime as a treaty partner by the West, with its implied renunciation of further pressure for German reunification, would undermine Dr. Adenauer's position with the West German electorate, and hence West German loyalty to the Western alliance. But the risk is greater than that: not only would opposition to Dr. Adenauer's policy increase, but the character of that opposition would change. Already, the West German Social Democrats show dangerous signs of willingness to renounce, for the sake of national unity, not only the alliance (which might be reasonable, though contrary to present Western policy), but the guarantees of internal freedom of which they have hitherto been uncompromising defenders. If the West were to stop pressing for reunification, the danger would be not that the alliance might be "sold" in return for a Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe, as under the serious disengagement plans, but that it would have to be given away free, having disintegrated under the impact of a quickly increasing Communist infiltration of the Federal

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Republic. The instability of Communist Eastern Germany, which Khrushchev seeks to cure by pressing for its international recognition, would be replaced by a dangerous instability on *our* side of the demarcation line—a high price to pay for a new guarantee for West Berlin!

In the second place, neither Macmillan nor Lippmann seem to have thought out precisely what guarantees would be necessary to safeguard the future of West Berlin: they give the impression that the presence of Western troops and freedom of trade and transport are all that matters. As everybody in this city knows, and as Mayor Brandt has just explained in London, something else is as vital: the maintenance of Berlin's currency, financial, legal and constitutional links with the Federal Republic, without which the city's economy would be bound to decline and to become increasingly dependent on the surrounding East German economy. But Khrushchev's "offer" to negotiate a new statute for Berlin is based on the thesis that Berlin "is situated on the territory of the [East] German Democratic Republic," and that the latter would make a voluntary concession in permitting West Berlin's continued independence. Is he likely to "permit" the city's continued financial and constitutional association with the Federal Republic if, by agreeing to negotiate a "new title" for our presence there, we *ask* for his permission? I conclude that the old title, dating from the occupation and confirmed by Russia in 1949, is still the best relative safety we have got; it has lately had to be admitted by Mr. Khrushchev himself, and Lippmann's warnings against relying on the "right of conquest" are the only point in his articles where he seems to me to lapse from reasoned argument into woolly emotionalism.

Both practical objections ultimately rest on the fundamental one—that it is an illusion to believe that you can secure political stability by agreements with the Soviets. With luck and great patience, we may stabilize military frontiers or limit armaments; but politically, any agreement will mean a retreat either for them or for us—and if we recognize the status quo of their postwar conquests in Europe, it is a retreat for us which will result in more effective pressure on our own positions. Oddly enough, nobody has made that point more clearly than Lippmann himself after his talk with Khrushchev in Moscow, when he explained that for the Soviets the status quo is a dynamic and revolutionary concept. It seems a pity that he should have forgotten this insight so quickly.

BUT what is the alternative to the policy recommended by Lippmann? Is "standing pat" the only way of standing firm? In the short run this may well be necessary, though the American proposals for countering Khrushchev's "peace treaty" with a Western plan for approaching both German unity and European security in closely-linked stages may add a useful measure of flexibility to the necessary firm refusal to budge from our rights in Berlin. In the short run, therefore, we may have to put up with seeing the Berlin crisis through, and possibly seeing it repeated. But Lippmann should be the last to belittle the prospect that this may enable us all to "have our elections first." For it is only after the next round of elections that any chance may emerge for the West to escape genuinely from the dilemma of its German policy, and to embark on a new strategy based on the concept of disengagement. Those of us who, like Lippmann, regard it as politically dangerous to cling to a military concept of the East-West struggle which involves the West in upholding the political status quo of German and European partition, should never cease working for that long-term change of Western strategy. And they certainly should not recommend concessions to the Russians which, by legally freezing the status quo, would create new obstacles for its revision.

Berlin RICHARD LOWENTHAL

"Germanizing" Berlin

AS USUAL, Mr. Lippmann has presented an extremely thoughtful analysis of the problem with great distinction and elegance and, as usual, he has sought to offer an original and helpful solution. However, I think that given the circumstances produced by the Soviet time-bomb ultimatum on Berlin, it would be preferable for the Western world to limit itself in its negotiations, at least at the start, to the problem of "the two Berlins" rather than involving the problem of "the two Germanies."

Moscow has no legal or moral right to abrogate an international agreement unilaterally. But I believe we are foolish merely to stress this fact and not to accept an opportunity to improve our present position in West Berlin, which is and which will remain extremely uncomfortable while it continues.

The kernel of Khrushchev's original proposal seems to me to be a desire to "Germanize" the administration of Berlin. All other questions such as the status of the two Germanies, the reunification or non-reunification of Germany (and reunification is blatantly out of the question now) and European security are still secondary to the first problem, Berlin.

I think we should say to Mr. Khrushchev: "We do not accept your right to break an international agreement. But, since you are acting unilaterally and announcing your intentions of turning over the responsibility of East Berlin and the access to West Berlin to the Pankow government, we will unilaterally turn over the administration and protection of West Berlin to the Bonn goverment. Furthermore, we will unilaterally withdraw all United States, British and French military garrisons from West Berlin and replace them with West German garrisons. The new West German garrisons of West Berlin would be regarded as directly linked to NATO and guaranteed by that alliance just as firmly as the present

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United States, British and French garrisons. Furthermore, we will unilaterally turn over to the West German government the control and safety of the land, canal and air lanes leading to West Berlin, at present employed by American, British and French forces."

We should suggest to Moscow that, in order to reduce possible tension in the Berlin area, and also in order to more purely "Germanize" the administration of Berlin, the Soviet Union should agree to withdraw its own forces from a circular area perhaps 60 or 100 kilometers from the Brandenburg Gate. We could with justification point out to the Russians that this need not in any sense weaken their present security position in Eastern Europe and, at the same time, it would eliminate any possibility of the smallest ugly incident between Russian troops and West German troops, who have been built up by Soviet propaganda as the symbol of ugly "Western imperialist" intentions.

I personally think that this is a sounder negotiation approach than Mr. Lippmann's formula for putting the city and its protection under the United Nations where, of course, Moscow has a veto power in the Security Council. We would be "Germanizing" the administration of Berlin without in any way reducing the moral and physical strength of our present position and without in any way weakening that position by subjecting it to the diplomatic veto of other nations.

Two objections to this theory have been expressed. The first is that Moscow wouldn't accept it. It seems to me that we make a mistake in prejudging Soviet reactions to a formula which has certain advantages for the Russians—as well as disadvantages. If we make a positive suggestion of this sort, the onus for rejecting it would be placed upon the Kremlin.

The second argument is that the West Germans would not like it. But I believe it is now time for Bonn, as a full-fledged NATO ally, to accept some of the responsibilities of the alliance as well as benefiting from its umbrella. The West Germans prefer the plate glass window of American troops in West Berlin. But if NATO really means anything—and I think it does—it should grant equal protection to the forces of any and all its members. West German forces would be entitled to the same support from NATO that is now inferentially granted to American, British and French troops there.

An advantage of this formula is that not only would Berlin be "Germanized" but the United States, Britain and France would automatically be removed from their presently uncomfortable and ultimately untenable position and from the embarrassment of asserting that they remain in Berlin by "right of conquest." The three Western powers would then, under this formula, escape the embarrassment of having to decide whether to prepare to acknowledge the *de facto* existence of East Germany and they would escape the embarrassment of not knowing quite what to do if East German authorities insisted upon inspecting convoys.

Bonn need not be embarrassed by having to do business with Pankow. It is in constant contact with that regime and has signed formal trade agreements with it. This is the heart of the problem and the first issue that should be faced when we sit down to talk seriously with the Russians. It would be a diplomatic mistake to begin negotiations on the basis of some proposal such as that for a United Nations administration of Berlin (always subject to the awkward possibility of a Soviet veto and the need for log-rolling in the General Assembly) before we have carefully explored the chance of arriving at a new formula based upon the suggestions outlined above.

Paris C. L. SULZBERGER

Separating the Issues

The Russian policies which have created the Berlin crisis, and the reactions to them which can be expected from the West, re-enact—in a more threatening setting—the fundamental conflict which has pitted East against West since the end of World War II. This conflict is the very core of the Cold War.

The fundamental issue which has divided East and West has been the legitimacy of the territorial status quo as it had been established in 1945 by military conquest. The Soviet Union has always considered the line of demarcation of 1945 as the permanent and legitimate boundary between two spheres of influence, one dominated by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States. Stalin envisaged the postwar world divided into two such spheres, and he and his successors have many times—publicly and privately—tried to obtain Western recognition of the legitimacy of the two spheres and their boundary. The West has consistently refused to consider the actual boundary as anything more than a provisional line of demarcation which a definitive settlement must redraw considerably farther to the east, preferably so as to coincide with the frontiers proper of the Soviet Union.

Berlin is the symbol of this unresolved conflict. The Western foothold deep in the Soviet sphere, derived from the legal claim that Berlin is potentially the capital of a united Germany, symbolizes the provisional character of the boundary now running 100 miles west of Berlin. The utter precariousness of the Western position in Berlin, unenforceable on the spot and at the mercy of Russian discretion, reflects the relative permanence, as a matter of political and military fact, of the boundary dividing both Europe and Germany. In the measure that the prospects for that permanence increase and the practicality of unification fades away, Berlin comes to symbolize even more the actual weakness of the West rather than the soundness of its legal claim.

It is against this background of the symbolic function

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which Berlin has fulfilled in the Cold War that one must consider the alternative policies which are at the disposal of the West. The Russian attack upon the Western position in Berlin implies a commitment to the permanence of the division of Germany. The West can counter this attack by standing firm, by not giving an inch, by pretending that nothing has changed since 1945. This is the position West Germany and France have taken.

The West can go to the other extreme by starting from the assumption that, with Germany being divided in virtual permanence, the Western position in Berlin has become an anachronism. In order to make that position tenable it is then necessary to restore the expectation of German reunification upon which the Western position was originally based. This can be accomplished only by an over-all negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union. The British Government has taken this position, and it must be added in passing that Macmillan follows here in the footsteps of Churchill, as Khrushchev follows in Stalin's. Churchill advocated such a settlement in more than 40 speeches which, in so far as they were reported at all, were dismissed in this country as election propaganda—as are his successor's proposals today.

The third alternative open to the West coincides by and large with Mr. Lippmann's position. It consists of a shift in the legal basis for the Western presence. That shift would go in the direction of internationalizing that legal basis by putting it under the auspices of the United Nations and perhaps also that presence itself by adding neutral contingents to those of the Western allies. Berlin would then symbolize less the unity of Germany than the interest of the international community in a Western enclave in the Communist world.

Of the three alternatives for Western policy, the first is the easiest to choose. It requires little thought and no action at all. It will look heroic and might see us through this crisis while leaving us unprepared for the next one, without contributing anything to the settlement of the conflict of which the current crisis is a mere surface manifestation. The second alternative requires a full measure of statesmanship, great daring, and the taking of considerable risks. It can easily be dismissed as impractical, and so it might well turn out to be. For what has the West to offer the Soviet Union in exchange for at least the first genuine steps toward the unification of Germany? But since genuine over-all negotiations have never been tried—to put forward proposals which on the face of them cannot be accepted by the other side is not to negotiate—it has still to face the test of its practicality.

Mr. Lippmann's proposal requires the willingness and ability to negotiate on the limited issue of the Western position in Berlin. By separating that issue from the problem of German unification, it reconciles Germany's division in relative permanence with the Western presence in Berlin. Such a formula might solve the present crisis and forestall another one over the same issue. It is a formula for dealing with a symptom. It does not pretend to deal with the disease itself. Yet this disease, uncured and even unattended, will erupt again into symptoms of a different kind, each likely to be more serious than the preceding one. Today, the inflexibility of the French and West German Governments hamstrings Western policy. Tomorrow, the flexibility of the two Germanies—one armed with nuclear weapons, the other controlling the accesses to Berlin—might well threaten the world with destruction. Perhaps it is impractical to suggest that the thinkers and statesmen of the world concern themselves with so grave an issue. Yet the very impracticality of the suggestion is a measure of the decline of statesmanship on both sides of the line that divides East and West.

Princeton, N. J. HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Security vs *Expansion*

In his argument Walter Lippmann proceeds from two assumptions:

1. If the Kremlin gives us East Germany, the entire satellite system will liquidate itself.

2. The United States has the right and the moral obligation to remain in Berlin until that city is again the capital of a reunited Germany.

These conceptions are correct. Russia cannot give up East Germany as long as she believes it necessary to constrain Poland militarily from two sides. Therefore, the only realistic basis for a German reunification would seem to be a disengagement policy with the aim of convincing Russia that the United States would refrain, both militarily and politically, from moving into those regions that the Russians would abandon. In a round-table discussion on the air which I opened a year ago with this line of thought, there was unanimity on the subject among the SPD representative of the Federal Diet Erler, the CDU Federal Minister Lemmer, and myself. In my opinion only such a policy could guarantee a genuine consolidation in the long run. It would considerably loosen the ties between Russia and her satellites, but even for Russia there exists a *raison d'état* that makes her prefer lasting security to a policy of expansion, if this expansion can only be achieved by constant military pressure on unwilling allies. The United States could run the risk of a German neutralization—not as a payment in anticipation of agreement but as a final state of affairs—if, as a result, all Russian troops would disappear from the territory west of the Russian border.

Any forthcoming settlement of the Berlin question must be examined in the light of whether or not it leaves room for such a long-term development. For, without such a long-term solution there will be no peace either

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in Germany or in the eastern countries of Central Europe. Even though no uprising is immediately threatening, the social and moral situation of today is no different from that of 1953 or 1956, for neither the workers nor the youth of the subjugated countries have been or can be won for the Soviet system.

A United Nations guarantee is not only tolerable for Germany, it is highly desirable if (1) the troops of Western Powers remain in Berlin, if (2) they retain their strength and (3) the rights they presently enjoy. A token occupation by United Nations troops makes sense only if it also includes East Berlin. However, one could also envisage another type of participation by the UN.

To me the most ingenious solution would appear to be a transfer of the seat of the United Nations to Berlin. Then the fire brigades would be stationed at the point of the biggest fire hazard and they could gather experience at the spot of highest tension. Such a solution being utopian, however, it would be worth considering whether certain United Nations committees with competencies beyond those connected with the Berlin guarantee should not be transferred to Berlin, hold their meetings here in Berlin, meetings at which influential representatives could regularly convince themselves of the long-run untenability of such a settlement. Thus the distressing condition of the oppressed East German people and the incompatibility of East German policy with principles proclaimed by the Soviets would be demonstrated to the world *ad oculos*. And the representatives of the United Nations would themselves experience the chicaneries to which communication between both parts of Germany or between West Berlin and the Federal Republic is subject.

Any new settlement of the Berlin status would be acceptable to Germany only if it brought with it a final improvement of communication for the Berliners and, more than that, a betterment of lines of communication for the East German population with West Germany. If that population is to be left to the mercy of the Ulbricht regime, it will be better to retain the present status. That is to say a United Nations guarantee would also have to include a minimum of free intercourse within Germany as a whole, a regulation to which the Federal Republic could easily submit.

How the Germans would react to a redefinition of the Berlin status will depend on how much relief they can reasonably expect and how certain they can be that the disengagement policy will not be abandoned, but rather continued with the aim of securing a true consolidation. In other words, the impending settlement is likely to be considered a middle-range solution. The danger of German nationalism resurging is negligible at the present time. It will not be great in 1961, the time of the next elections. There is no danger whatever of a nationalistic Germany throwing herself into the arms of Communism. In one respect, nevertheless, the Germans must themselves prepare the ground for a sensible future: the relationship between government and opposition must not be burdened by politicians who label the other party "gravedigger of Germany." To this task American policy can contribute by remaining trustworthy in the eyes of both parties.

Berlin OTTO HEINRICH V. D. GABLENTZ

The Larger Bargain

Effective diplomats, like successful generals or politicians, must be prepared for any reasonable contingency. The behavior of one's adversary can never be predicted with precision. This is especially true in negotiating with the Soviets.

Walter Lippmann has performed a valuable service in his brilliant analysis. He points out that the long stalemate between Russia and the West over Germany is not likely to be broken in the near future, short of the overt use of force. He cautions us against opening up the larger questions of European security, and says we should concentrate on the Berlin problem.

The weight of evidence may support his interpretation, but I believe we should look upon the talks in Geneva and beyond as an opportunity to explore the larger problems of German reunification and European security. The issues that divide us are deep and fundamental. But the stakes are high, and we should not leave a stone unturned in our effort to explore the possibility of reducing tension.

I have reason to believe that Secretary of State Herter and his aides are prepared to bargain on the larger questions of European security. I hope they will place new and imaginative proposals before the Soviets dealing with the knotty problems of German reunification and arms limitation and control in Central Europe.

If the Soviets show no disposition to discuss the larger issues, our representatives should, of course, be prepared with a series of negotiating positions on the Berlin question itself. Here Mr. Lippmann makes his greatest contribution. A new Berlin statute guaranteeing our right of access under some military authority involving both the three Western powers and a United Nations presence would be a net gain for us.

We should not be so anxious for agreement that we will enter into lopsided arrangements in which we surrender the substance of real advantage for the shadow of empty promises. The maintenance of a strong and honorable position true to our highest values, even if it means continued tension, is more desirable than an agreement just for the sake of accomplishing something, but which in fact undercuts our position in the process.

Some limited settlement on troop deployment or arms control may pave the way for more comprehensive agreements later on. We should not expect that a Berlin

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statute, or any other particular agreement with the Soviets, will end the Cold War. Neither the Austrian treaty, which was hailed by some as the harbinger of a new day, nor the Korean truce, has changed substantially the level of hostility between the two camps. This mighty struggle between two opposing ways of organizing society may go on for decades. We must be prepared at all times for the worst without being unprepared for the best.

Washington, D. C. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Convincing the Germans

MR. LIPPMANN'S thesis, that Germany is likely to stay divided for a considerable time to come, is one which I hold myself and have done for the last two years. But before trying to secure the modus vivendi which he has outlined, it will be necessary to convince West German opinion that the continued division of Germany for some time to come is indeed inevitable. No admission of this would be readily forthcoming from either the West German Government or the opposition parties at the moment. German reunification is even more a dogma than it is a recognizable objective. West German opinion is influenced by dogma, and not by the sort of closely reasoned arguments which Mr Lippmann employs. It would, at the outset, be horrified at the idea of a modus vivendi; it would take a long time to get used to that idea.

In the second place, it is not only necessary to secure full German assent to a new and realistic policy; it is also necessary to demand explicit German admission of joint responsibility for such a policy. There is an ingrained German tendency to regard the Great Powers as solely responsible for the division of Germany. There is very little recognition of Hitler's personal share, and the share of the German people in dividing Germany. The German tendency is to blame the Great Powers for failure to bring reunification nearer. The Germans would blame the Great Powers even more for a modus vivendi which sealed Germany's division for a long time to come.

There is a third difficulty about Mr. Lippmann's overall plan. Dr. Adenauer believes that his own policy for German reunification has not yet even been put to the test. The two unfulfilled elements of the Adenauer Plan are that NATO forces should be brought up to full strength in Central Europe, and that nuclear weapons should be given to the Bundeswehr (or, at least, preparations for giving them to the Bundeswehr brought to their final stage). The Adenauer thesis—given the dramatic change in Western policy which Mr. Lippmann envisages—would be that he was never given the chance to secure reunification in his way. For he believes that no diplomatic offensive can succeed until it is backed by the requisite degree of Western military strength. Military, material, moral pressure must, in fact, be maintained until the West is ready to act in the diplomatic field.

These considerations in no way alter Mr. Lippmann's main premises—which are that Germany will stay divided for a long time and that the Berlin question requires urgent regulation. But it must be realized that the Adenauer Government, the Berlin City Government and the people of West Berlin will all object to a change in Berlin's status which would put it under United Nations control. The majority German view is that it is the presence of Western garrisons in Berlin which alone safeguards the freedom and independence of two and a half million West Berliners. I have myself asked some of them whether they would not feel equally safe if United Nations garrisons guarded them. They were, each and all, horribly alarmed. Their view was that a UN garrison would be an experiment, and that Berlin was the worst possible testing-ground for experiments.

I do not agree with Mr. Lippmann that Dr. Adenauer's reason for not recognizing the East German state is because he is frightened of recognition producing "nationalism on the rampage." I believe his reason is fear of prolonging the status quo indefinitely—or more, operatively, of being *blamed* for prolonging it. For Adenauer is a realist, and he must know that the prospects of changing the status quo significantly are small. In a sense, then Mr. Lippmann is right in thinking that the 1961 West German election is already a factor in West German thought. But, here again, opposition parties are at least as much influenced as Dr. Adenauer is by the dogma that German reunification will, must take place.

I believe that Mr. Lippmann, in producing plans which deserve a great deal more thought than I can express in a few lines, may be underrating one major Russian and East German objective. This is to gain control of the whole of Berlin. For with Berlin as its capital, the East German satellite would gain immensely in prestige and lasting-power. The Russian plan for a "free city" of West Berlin was clearly intended only as a first stage in the absorption of Berlin by the East German Republic. It is, of course, possible that Mr. Lippmann has thought this out himself; at least, his plan for a UN status for Berlin suggests this.

To sum up, I would say that the coming international conferences must be used for a solid and inventive Western effort to secure German reunification. The German people will be satisfied with nothing less. If such an effort fails, then Mr. Lippmann's plans will deserve every consideration. But there is not the slightest chance of convincing the German Government or people that they must be adopted now, before the Foreign Ministers meet on May 11. This does not make Mr. Lippmann's candor and realism any the less valuable.

Bonn TERENCE PRITTIE

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Gang-war Among the Children

by Donald Cook

IT'S not often that a judge writes a book describing a single trial within a year of its conclusion. When he does, and when its title is *The Jury Is Still Out,* one may suspect that the trial had been deeply disturbing. Judge Davidson is Judge of New York County's Court of General Sessions, and has been in the New York State Legislature, the Court of Special Sessions, and a Representative to the 84th Congress from New York's 20th District. Near the end of this book, he writes, " . . . the Farmer case had caused me more inner turmoil than any previous experience in my life."

The Jury Is Still Out
by Irwin D. Davidson and Richard Gehman
(Harper; $4.50)

The case made enough press that most people will remember something about it. On July 30, 1957, about 20 boys drifted northward from a rendezvous at 152nd St. and Broadway, into a park surrounding a swimming pool off Amsterdam Avenue at 174th St. Here there occurred an encounter—apparently fortuitous—with two boys. One, Michael Farmer, died that night in the hospital; the other, Roger McShane, was three months recovering from his wounds. The trial of seven boys from 15 to 18 years old, which began the following January, ended in April with a set of verdicts which I have heard caustically summarized: "The two Negroes got convictions. The two whites got off. With the three spics they split the difference—one off, and the rap for two."

Between the killing and the verdict, a million and a half words of testimony were piled up, and it is this that Davidson's account is based upon; it is a dogged, literal, almost diaristic account of the trial itself, with very little background material or connection with other accounts in social work or theory, statistics, or other cases. The reader must construct the pattern from unrelieved testimony and cross-examination, assembling fragments weighted for credibility, as painfully as does a psychoanalyst or patient with dream material. The whole process was continually under harassment from an unceasing barrage of objections and motions for mistrial from the defense attorneys (31 of them before the trial was through, all but one appointed by the Court). Their tactics, at times united in opposition to the prosecution, at times splitting when evidence favoring one defendant jeopardized another, formed a kind of play within a play whose most violent climax —a near fistfight between lawyers—enraged the judge and left the defendants laughing.

A trial like this is the eye of a hurricane, where relative calm prevails as the legal ritual unfolds, but upon which there intrude from various quarters intimations of surrounding storms.

From the boys themselves, two main pictures emerge. First, a remarkable picture of the autonomy and complexity of gang life. Testimony was taken not only from the defendants, but also from six other participants in the killing who, because of their youth, were sent to Children's Court, and from there to "state training schools." "One by one they came, sullen and resentful, at times briefly defiant, to testify against their former henchmen in language that, despite my experience as a judge with thieves, narcotics addicts, hoodlums and prostitutes, I had never heard." These thirteen boys were members of the Egyptian Dragons, a gang enmeshed with other gangs in a web of allies and enemies, much like some American Indian tribes or Balkan countries. Amongst the enemies were the Jesters, a predominantly Irish uptown gang which had *prohibited* the Egyptian Kings from using the swimming pool where the killing took place, "because they were colored." (It never becomes certain whether Farmer was a Jester, but it does seem certain that he was not acting in any official capacity). In keeping with their protective-aggressive function, the gangs have appropriately defined roles for their leaders:

Q. On July 30, 1957, were you an officer of the Egyptian Dragons?
A. War Lord.
Q. War *what?*
A. Lord.
Q. *War Lord?*
A. Yes.

Direct testimony also gives a picture of the boys' backgrounds, which are a magnified distortion of all the dismal social correlations ever collected by criminologists. In only *one* case (white, acquitted) are both parents on the scene. Two came from Puerto Rico and one from the Dominican Republic, and each was raised by one parent who was working (at best). Odd relations and landladies filled in for parents for several years at a time. One boy (Dominican, convicted) made a boat trip to America alone at age 12, knowing no English, to be with his mother. Another (Negro, convicted) was born in Alabama, raised by his grandmother until he was four, by an aunt until he was ten, then by his grandmother again until he was fourteen. He picked cotton 14 hours a day for $7 a week. When he came to New York to join his mother (they slept in the same room), he could not get a job since the State of Alabama had no record of his birth, so that he could not get working papers in New York. Another defendant lost his speech for a year when he was six, and had been sent to a clinic for tantrums.

SEVERAL INTRUSIONS blew into the trial directly from the outside. In the last three rows of spectators' seats "was a grim phalanx of black-jacketed, greasy-haired friends . . . friends or sympathizers of the seven boys on trial; they had come down from uptown like an invading army in leather uniforms. They never caused a disturbance of any kind; they came, they stared, they listened. I never saw one speak to another. They came every day of the trial."

But as the trial became a cause célèbre in New York gang life, things began to happen. McShane, Farmer's co-victim, was threatened by mail during his testi-

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mony. Judge Davidson got a letter saying, "If you do not free those boys you will be killed." *El Diario de Nueva York* published a letter, in Spanish, declaring war on all cops, signed with the names of nine gangs all over town. A witness who testified that his uptown gang had planned to join the Egyptian Kings in an attack on the Jesters had his face blown off by a shotgun blast after the verdicts were given.

Adults, too, got into the show. Postcards to Davidson called him "Jew bastard" and "Communist," while others sentimentalized about the poor misguided boys. One day the trial was interrupted by a fundamentalist minister from Pennsylvania who wanted to solve the whole thing by prayer. "I have sixty-five teen-agers praying and fasting for two days that God give me the opportunity to speak to these boys about their salvation." Court officers rushed him out.

Institutional machinery went into motion. The families of three of the boys involved in the case were threatened with eviction from the low-rent housing development they lived in, having been classified, prior to any verdicts, as "undesirable tenants" by the New York City Housing Authority, "because in each case one of their members committed an act of violence." Davidson writes of this: "I was shocked by this news. I wished there were something I could have done. I could not even call political friends to ask them to intercede."

Finally, the ever-present question of the role of the police. The defense tried hard to hinge the case on evidence of police brutality in rounding up defendants and getting stories from them; although they were not successful, it seems that some fairly sadistic episodes did take place. A couple of defendants lost some teeth before the trial started, and stuck to their stories of threats of being shot "while escaping" and of electrocution. Detectives were put on the stand, but made even the jury impatient by statements such as: "In twenty-two years on the force, I have never witnessed an act of police brutality." One choice bit: "Detective John Weber, six foot three, 240 pounds of cop . . . appeared stunned when he was asked if he were known as 'Crazy Weber,' 'Strong-Arm John,' 'Strong-Arm Weber,' or 'Big Man Weber'." Weber grinned as he denied these nicknames."

At least equally important is the following remark concerning the police on the beat:

> I was to learn to my horror and astonishment that many of the police actually were terrified of these infants. "You know," one policeman . . . said to a colleague of mine, "We hesitate before we pick up a kid. Even if we stop him for questioning because he looks suspicious, the next thing we know he's got his mother in complaining to the desk—and then it's suspension for a week without pay for us. These kids don't fear cops. They *hate* cops."

These are sordid anecdotes, but I don't think they can be tempered. In view of the abysmal institutional and social disorder which they document, a feeling of unreality develops as the

For the Circuit of the Orpheum and the Isis

WHERE are the stars of our rich balconies
When roosted with the pigeons we would stare
In hopeless schoolgirl fashion at some dark
Small dapper and silk-suited god
Chanting in a sad-white spotlight all our loves
And playing with delicious frippery
Upon our harp-strung nerves to see him so
And thus to see him so to think his gaze
Beneath the fixed white lightning, tranced
Had trained, transfixed, upon our own
What we as much caught up in it, returned:

And those white doves that the magician feigned
Forth by such an elegance to come
From out a long and silken handkerchief?
Dexterity, the pleasure of the sense,
Raised to some most lissom, slipping height,
And all commanded at a dreamlike pace:
The birds, the cards he glides into his hat,
The birds that sit on perches in their cage
Once he has made them out of air
And that long flow of undulating scarf:

And where the loose and practised acrobats,
The frantic clowns ablaze with lunacy
And pistol shots and waterworks and firecrackers
That light the coda of a second tale?
Saints of our tired mortality who get
The kick in the pants with punctual artlessness
As being that which lunacy desires:

And where, and where the old guards of the hall
Each with his act that lasts a briefest while:
Simple, irrelevant and based
On what they figure will connect us all:
Gauche and *louche* and rude and wet
And fake with hot sweet tears that soon dry up,
And where lost innocence and all its troupe
Put up in paper sunsets for the sale?

Oh blue-eyed lie, you know it's true,
Some sums of living are we would forget
All that we never wished to know.
This is the wisdom of the booby trap
And let these pranksters deal it like
Pages from the gull's hornbook
To that soft vertigo the violin's mew starts up
The while we come to laugh our anger out
And laugh here in the demi-dark,
The sands of charm now heavy in our eyes,
At this mock world that plays at ducks and drakes
With all our devil-worship for what hurts
And all our heavy reverence for the real—
Like some exact machinery blowing up.

It is a trick: it tells us just as much
As that bright horse who does arithmetic.
But then—the pratfalls and the miracles
And one low voice that cries it lives
And one low voice that cries it lives
And one low voice that cries it lives by love.

JEAN GARRIGUE

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reader ploughs through pages devoted to ascertaining whether this defendant *wore* or *carried* his garrison belt uptown, whether that defendant had been drinking or not, whether a third defendant did or did not have a fishing sinker on the end of his dog chain. Yet these are the issues which decided that two boys were convicted of second degree murder, two of second degree manslaughter, and that three should be released as not guilty. *Which* boys kill and which get killed under circumstances such as these seems a matter of chance. It might just as easily have been the Jesters on trial, or the Mau Maus of Fort Greene, or the Brooklyn Dragons.

I think this must have been the feeling that has prompted Judge Davidson, as a result of this trial, to consult with the State Youth Commission, examine the policies of other states, and develop a plan for the location of incipient juvenile delinquents, and for the provision of State-supported self-governing boys' communities. This plan is briefly sketched as an appendix to the book. It avoids the usual pitfalls of expecting dislocated boys to be grateful for the opportunity to perform menial labor for pittance wages, and attempts to build upon the very powerful loyalty systems which many gang members show toward their own group. It also envisages realistic contact with a return path: apprenticeships with cooperating labor organizations. This plan, like others which have been and continue to be proposed, suffers from one defect: it does not take into account the social and political problems which would arise in the course of a realistic implementation. Walter B. Miller, an outstanding corner-group worker, has documented how agencies originally united in sponsoring a delinquency program, fall to evasion, postponement and quarreling as the phase of positive action approaches. We are only beginning to understand how deep can be the vested interests in a status quo which is quite objectively destroying itself.

But pressures are mounting. Important questions remain unsolved in this area; but, as with the segregation problem, much is known which could serve as the basis for reform. Whether such knowledge gets utilized in the near future may well be one of the major political issues in American life.

Books in Brief

Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico in 1940, slowly dying with his skull broken by an ice-axe: what a set-up, with all its background conspiracies, for a novel by Graham Greene. Bertrand Wolfe, who takes a crack at the subject, was a member of Trotsky's secretarial staff for a few months in 1937; he says that before writing this novel he waited

The Great Prince Died
by Bernard Wolfe
(Scribner's; $4.50)

all these years in order "to develop the necessary emotional distance."

Perhaps his inescapable, continued emotional closeness to the events has served him better than he knows, for in spite of some tricky language ("stains of smile spreading over their faces"), he neatly conveys the atmosphere: the hot glare of Mexico, the dusty vegetation, the exile's nervous house bristling with guards. The murder itself is described with skill and force.

The protagonist, except in the scene of the fatal attack, is pretty much a talking-machine figure. Mr. Wolfe tries to "motivate" him by showing him as haunted by the authoritative attitude he had adapted at the time the Kronstadt revolt was crushed in 1921. The trouble is that this and other ideological matters cram the book with dialectics—hackneyed arguments and wearying documents—which too often become substitutes for the kind of dramatization through character that gives life to political novels and dramas. It's not unfair at this point to invoke the play *Julius Caesar,* since the purpose isn't an attempt to compare a current novelist with Shakespeare but simply to point to a model for stories about conspiracies and assassinations. Whether Brutus is "right" or "wrong" (or "Left") is incidental beside the point that he is made to seem alive. Dostoevsky's *The Possessed* (just now revivified by Camus on the Paris stage) can also be mentioned, as well as a couple of Conrad's novels.

But Graham Greene is the most appropriate counter, since he manages to deliver a certain amount of doctrine without (usually) ruining his stories; he shows people living inside doctrine. This is what Mr. Wolfe doesn't quite do, and it's too bad that he brooded over his own novel so long without being able to get rid of all the clogging dialectics, for his story has enough vigor and sense of what plot should be to suggest that the results could have been much better.

Harry T. Moore

•

The setting of this study by a distinguished psychologist at Princeton's Institute for International Social Research is France and Italy, and the focus of the research is on the "protest voter," the person who votes for, but is not a member of, the Communist Party. This includes roughly one-fourth of the voters in the two countries who support the Communists at the polls, but only a

The Politics of Despair
by Hadley Cantril
(Basic Books; $5.00)

fraction of whom hold Communist Party cards.

The interviews conducted by Professor Cantril and his coworkers suggest that the protest voter is frustrated and insecure, in many cases for simple material reasons. In France, for example, there are two million families living in buildings constructed before the Battle of Waterloo; in Italy there are one million living in caves, hovels and other makeshift shelters. Other dissatisfactions relate to lack of status, opportunity, participation and "belongingness." French and Italian workers speak of themselves as "the forgotten ones."

"Official" US ideological pronouncements in terms of "people's capitalism" tend to produce greater resentment and ridicule, according to the study. As a typical respondent put it: "How can you call it 'people's capitalism' when there are people who are capitalists and others who are not?" Professor Cantril states that the protest voter, like every other human being, "wants to experience more frequently and in new ways what he senses is *potentially* available out there in the world around him to be experienced and enjoyed." He is not a Communist between elections, but he will vote Communist "until something better comes along."

Alfred E. Kuenzli

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THEATRE

A Noisy "Destry"

DESTRY, an off-beat Deputy Sheriff who has ridden through three movie versions of the story Max Brand wrote about him, is riding again in a big, splashy, noisy musical. Pistols go off every few moments, putting out lamps, severing chandelier cords, and killing sheriffs. Mirrors are broken, whips are cracked, hundreds of people (apparently) leap from balconies onto the floor, and the orchestra plays as if to split the last ear drums. Obviously Michael Kidd (director and choreographer) set out to prove that the stage can rough it up as well as the screen. He has amply demonstrated the point, but he has not produced a memorable show. Its gaudy bluster will earn money for its backers, but that will be the sum total of its contribution.

Destry Rides Again
Music and lyrics by Harold Rome
Book by Leonard Gershe
(Imperial Theatre)

The trouble, as usual, is in the book. In this case the story is simply too slight to support the great big production Mr. Kidd and company have built on top of it. Destry, the friendly Deputy Sheriff of Bottleneck, refuses to tote a gun. Bottleneck is a very rough town. Kent (I don't know whether that's his first name or his last name) is a bad man. He has henchmen. They carry guns. Frenchy is Kent's woman. She carries on all over town. Destry is regarded as a boob, though of course, when it comes right down to it, he can shoot straighter than anybody else in the West. Destry falls in love with Frenchy (which isn't surprising since Dolores Gray has endowed her with beautiful long legs and a bewitchingly low voice). Frenchy also falls in love with Destry (which *is* surprising, as he is not her type at all). Destry gets angry when his friend Wash, the Sheriff, is killed. He stages a big scene down at the Last Chance Saloon in which all the bad people get shot without his having to fire his pistol once. Frenchy, to be sure, must save him by doing some shooting herself, but that's all right since she was never as pure as he. Frenchy and Destry then go off arm in arm and the audience does the same.

I WILL NOT make the mistake of treating this kind of legend seriously by commenting on it as part of "the American myth." The musical does well at the beginning when it tells the outlandish tale as if to kid the pants off all Westerns. But later it drifts away from that point of view and begins to take the story soberly, as if we really believed in Destry and were going to be warmed by Frenchy's heart of gold. At that point; even though the music and the dancing do their best to keep spirits up, things become soggy and sag.

The principal assets of the entertainment, in descending order of importance, are these:

1. Andy Griffith as Destry. Mr. Griffith is the best comedian we now have for playing the hayseed among the city slickers. Let a woman in a transparent peignoir slide onto his lap and he can be hilarious jumping up and apologizing: "I beg your pardon, Ma'am, did I take your seat?" By such means, he brings to *Destry* about the only human interest it has.

2. Michael Kidd's choreography. It is a delight, at least until one realizes that it all looks alike. Mr. Kidd is the leading exponent of the Emphatic School of Choreography. It is characterized by jumping, stomping, crouching, leaping, and (in the case of the girls), whirling the skirts. Each maneuver is concluded with an attitude of "So there!"

3. The sets (Oliver Smith), costumes (Alvin Colt), and lighting (Jean Rosenthal). These are in such vivid hues that I felt there should be a note in the Playbill saying "Color by Technicolor." Mr. Smith has done his numerous backdrops in a meticulously realistic style reminiscent of paintings by Andrew Wyeth. The result is decidedly worth seeing, but its interest is more visual than dramatic. The director should have said, "Very beautiful. Now give me something that will help tell the story."

4. The supporting cast, especially a brilliant dancer named Swen Swenson. He and Marc Breaux and George Reeder have an exciting number in which they crack whips, but I like Mr. Swenson even better when he is allowed to prance around the stage, saucy as a circus horse and agile as a deer. His work here and in last year's *Ulysses in Nighttown* establishes him as one of the best in the business.

5. One of the musical numbers, entitled "Are You Ready, Gyp Watson?" This number seems destined to become a hit and will be recorded by just about everybody and his orchestra. It stopped the show, having entered cleverly in one of those rare moments when Mr. Kidd let his company remain at ease long enough to be stopped.

Destry has everything it needs except the light touch.

TOM F. DRIVER

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MOVIES

The False Choice

THE directing-writing partnership of Vittorio de Sica and Cesare Zavattini has produced some memorable films—*Shoeshine, Bicycle Thief, Miracle in Milan,* and *Umberto D.* Together with the best of Rossellini, these are the flower of postwar Italian neo-realism, which, after the horror of war and in disgust with the factions that caused it, wanted to make blunt statements about the contemporary world. But to me, there were always latent fallacies in neo-realism and they have overwhelmed the latest de S-Z film, *The Roof.*

The Roof
(Trans-Lux)

Zavattini has said that he dislikes conventional screen stories because they impose dead formulas on living social facts and create "metaphorical" situations. "If I use living, real characters with which to sound reality, people in whose life I can directly participate, my emotion becomes more effective, morally stronger, more useful." The logical outcome of these beliefs is to use non-actors, which is what this team has done.

How fine it sounds. How vigorous to sweep away the tinsel with which the merchants have burdened films. But analysis shows, I believe, not only the sterility of the theory but also that the virtues of the S-Z films derive from the very elements they abhor: metaphor and contrivance.

Was the script of *Bicycle Thief* improvised as the events of the day's shooting dictated? Or was it carefully prepared by Zavattini (from a novel, incidentally)—arranged and pruned for clarity and growth? Were the non-actors simply turned loose before the camera or were they carefully coached, wheedled, flagellated by a brilliant actor-director? The choice propounded by the neo-realists is between "living, real characters" and the arts of acting and writing, but the choice is spurious. De Sica and Zavattini have not, despite their theory, given up the latter for the former because the two are not mutually exclusive.

But in *The Roof* they have tried again, more obstinately than ever, to make that false choice, and they have forced the issue so far as to produce their first dull film. They strove to make this film as much like life as possible. Therefore its hour and a half contains moments of pathos and humor and excitement together with long stretches that are not particularly interesting. Just like your life and mine.

The story was developed from a sketch that Zavattini wrote in 1952 for an episodic documentary about Italy (never filmed) and deals with the search of a young couple for a house in overcrowded Rome. Finally, with the help of friends, they build a tiny one-room house overnight. Italian law provides that, no matter where a house stands, people cannot be evicted from it if it has a roof and a front door that closes. The problem is to finish, to get the roof and the door on before the dawn and the police come. The idea is appealing. If Zavattini had been more concerned with character development and story texture than with avoidance of "metaphor," if de Sica had invested one quarter of the rehearsal time in appropriate professionals that he gave to eliciting verisimilitude from non-actors, this might have been a poignant film.

De Sica's preference for non-actors (they cannot even be called amateurs) is well-known. In speaking of Ingmar Bergman (*NR,* April 27), I suggested that this theatre director looks on films as a free form, a chance for rhapsody. De Sica—even more experienced in the theatre—also sees the film as a contrast to the theatre, not as a free form but as a medium for non-acting, for *being.* But the postulate quickly wears thin because he cannot let his non-actors *be,* he has to try to make them act. Sometimes (and this is a tribute to his enormous talent) he succeeds fairly well, as in *Bicycle Thief;* but how often in *Umberto D.* I wished he had started with a good actor in the title role.

De Sica's revolt is, presumably, against both the star image—the actor whose persona is so familiar that the audience has difficulty in believing that he is poor or Elizabethan or jilted—and against the very techniques of acting themselves, as being too visible on the screen. We all know multiple dreadful examples to substantiate these dislikes; but they do not prove that the extreme opposite is either true or a solution.

The seduction of the camera lies in making us think that because it can state a thing forcefully, it necessarily states it meaningfully. We have all seen salon photographs of dewdrops on petals, of brick walls and sand dunes that seem to have been made simply because it was possible to make them. But the camera speaks so emphatically that it is only after the initial impact of the utterance that we realize that little has been said.

The neo-realist film-maker, drunk on photography, looks at an actor playing a bumbling youth on the stage and thinks: "With my camera I can record the real bumblings of a real youth. *Ipso facto,* how much better." Because it is possible, it is therefore an improvement. It would be wasting the advantages of film to bring that actor out of the theatre before the camera because the film allows us to use the bumbling youth himself.

Some directors have shown that this procedure can have startling, often beautiful results. The combined efforts of *artists* behind the camera sometimes can secure enough good photographs of non-artists to be woven into a good film. But this is the exception; the dogged dedication of artists to non-art eventually produces banality in story and vacuity in performance.

WHAT films this Italian team could make if they would admit that, in the theatre or in the film, without or with a camera, art *is* metaphor—a process, not an occurrence. Their outstanding pictures represent a triumph of their art over their denial of it. Let them leave real people and the photographic mentality to *Life* and the newsreels. Without blinking one jot of reality but with developed, conscious screenplays and competent actors, they could make films that would truly crystallize the spirit of their age. (Like Fellini and Satyajit Ray.) Their present obsession seems to me like that of the neo-realist playwright in Pinero's *Trelawny of the Wells* (1898) who thought the theatre would at last come into its own if it discarded painted drops and wings and used real doors and real doorknobs.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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MUSIC

The City Center Style

For the past two years, the New York City Opera Company—in fulfillment of a generous grant-in-aid from the Ford Foundation—has devoted its spring season to American works composed within the last quarter of a century. The General Director of the company, Julius Rudel, reports that he chose the repertory from more than 200 scores which crossed his desk, and says, in a prepared statement:

> I am impressed with the variety and scope that these American works present—a scope as broad as America itself—encompassing all styles, from folk opera to the advanced idiom.

To anybody who has been through two seasons at the City Center, this is a titillating remark; if there is one characteristic almost totally absent from Mr. Rudel's repertory, it is variety. So far, most of the works performed have been either *opera seria* of the Italo-American school (three titles are by Menotti, the rest by composers in orbit around him) or frothy, commercial-sounding pieces, including three unpretentious Broadway musicals.

Mr. Rudel evidently thinks that he ought to Give the Public What It Wants, and that this means conventional, easily assimilated music. This assumption has led him into at least one serious error: he has put on several pieces that are totally un-stageworthy and that have nothing to recommend them beyond the fact that they conform to the style of the house. Norman dello Joio's *The Triumph of St. Joan*, for instance, gives the impression of being an oratorio that got into the opera house by mistake. The fundamental flaw in the work is that it is concerned with states of mind—with the inner drama that music is so well able to deal with at the concert level. There is nothing in the text that warrants action, costumes or sets. *St. Joan* plods on uneventfully, without a moment's respite, for more than an hour and a half before anything happens and by that time, of course, it is far too late to save the piece.

The effect of the City Center's stylistic preferences is to create the illusion that operatic composition in the US is confined to works that reflect the Menotti influence. This just isn't true, but there is a danger that, owing to the authority that reposes in the City Center, more and more composers will adopt the Italo-American style in the hope of being performed; in this way, a Menottiesque style can indeed become the official American operatic style.

It is evident from Mr. Rudel's programming that the number of composers doing good work in this style is, in fact, small. The best is still Menotti himself; in the season just completed, Menotti's were by far the best of the "serious" operas presented. All this proves is that somebody who is on fire with an idea stands a much better chance of producing distinguished work than his imitators do. One curious thing about the series is that Rudel appears to be running out of composers. In two seasons, he has done three operas by Menotti, and two each by Kurt Weill, Douglas Moore and Carlisle Floyd. In a series evidently meant to present a cross-section of American work in this field, there is something ominous about this kind of doubling up—especially when so many works by more important composers are allowed to go unperformed.

Evidently with the intention of disarming unfavorable criticism, Mr. Rudel has programmed just one piece in each season which might be construed as more "advanced" than the rest of the repertory. Last year, the work was *The Good Soldier Schweik* by Robert Kurka (*NR*, May 5, 1958). The Kurka score was neoclassical—far more tuneful than the conservative Italo-American works that are the staple of the company's repertory, but dry in texture.

This year, the "advanced" work was *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, with music by Hugo Weisgall and a libretto (drawn from Pirandello's play) by Denis Johnston.

The music is in a post-Expressionistic style; one in which the harmonic texture is created by using the notes of the chromatic scale in free rotation. As a consequence, much of the music is highly volatile. In the main, it is the vocal writing (most of it straightfor-

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ward) that gives an illusion of stability. The intervals are strong and, usually, conventional. There is the stuff of strong musical profile here, but the restless harmony seems to prevent the melodic flow from taking shape.

There is every sign of great polish and technical accomplishment in Weisgall's score; but it is, nonetheless, a most unfriendly and unattractive piece of music. For both Mr. Weisgall and his librettist, Mr. Johnston, seem to have deliberately meant to confuse the listener. At one point, somebody on stage sings:

> This certainly sounds like a real opera.
> Nobody knows what is going on!

Even if there are some ironies hidden in these two lines, they make a valid comment on the work itself.

Six Characters revolves around a metaphysical conceit which asks the question: "Which is more real, the Ideal or the Material?"; one is, I believe, at liberty to think that the "Author" in the title is God. The way the problem is posed is this: A group of real people are on the stage of an opera house rehearsing a new opera. They are interrupted by six imaginary people—the cast of an unfinished opera—and these characters play off their opera within the opera that we are witnessing. Naturally, things get pretty complicated as relations between the two casts develop.

But the natural complication of the plot itself is made almost impenetrable by Mr. Johnston's text, which is full of private jokes and jokes that double back on themselves, as in this speech from the opening scene, where the Director of the "real" people is addressing them:

> Today we shall rehearse our novelty again—
> Weisgall's "Temptation of St. Anthony".
> I know that some of you dislike it
> And say it isn't worthy of our repertoire.
> To tell the truth, I hate this modern tuneless stuff myself.

On the surface, it would appear that Weisgall is either spoofing himself for writing "modern, tuneless stuff," or spoofing the director for thinking that the stuff is modern and tuneless. As a matter of fact, it is both, *but*—and here is the complication—Weisgall hasn't written any opera called *The Temptation of St. Anthony*. And how is anybody supposed to know that? This is not an isolated example; it is one of dozens of complications which could have been introduced for only one reason: to make the listener feel out of things.

If there had been more "variety and scope" in the City Center's repertory, it would have been possible to justify the inclusion of *Six Characters* as a skillful example of a certain kind of tough writing. But it is curious that out of more than 200 scores, Rudel was able to find only one in a post-Expressionistic style that he wanted to exhibit, and that the one he selected should be so unsuited to the wants of a mass audience. It is almost as if Rudel had chosen a piece that could be offered as evidence that audiences don't like "modern" music.

This situation would not be without parallel. During Dimitri Mitropoulos' long tenure as musical director of the New York Philharmonic, it was his custom to favor the radical composers. It was Mitropoulos' stated view that the music of the future would be atonal music, with the result that he played a lot of strong atonal music. When he chose a more conservative score, it was usually a pale piece by a weak sister.

Discriminatory programming of this sort cannot be anything but bad for the musical life of this country. In the US, particularly, where the overwhelming majority of good composers are neither ultraconservatives nor radicals, a large-scale false impression such as that being created at City Center is alarming.

Since the emphasis of this project is on repertory, it is easy to forget that it is American in another very important sense: it represents a high level of American stagecraft adapted to the needs of operatic performance. I saw nine of this year's productions; and from a standpoint of singing, acting and staging, they set a standard that any opera company in the world could envy.

ROBERT EVETT

Notes on Contributors

DONALD COOK is engaged in psychological research. JEAN GARRIGUE's newest book is a collection of poems, *The Monument Rose*. HARRY T. MOORE is writing a new book about D. H. Lawrence. ALFRED E. KUENZLI is on the faculty of Southern Illinois University.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

idea and embroidered it with an assortment of incidents which can best be described collectively as hogwash. In doing so, they have conveyed an impression of the US Foreign Service which is far removed from the truth.

One of the book's principal themes is the necessity for our diplomats to speak the language of the country to which they are assigned. This is obviously desirable where practicable, and in emphasizing it the book serves a useful purpose. But the authors turn their argument into a ludicrous joke when they casually mention that one of their protagonists learns a completely strange foreign tongue in "five weeks of intense study."

It takes a language officer in the Foreign Service two years of intensive study before he is at ease under all circumstances in a foreign tongue (except one he may have studied at school.) This makes it unprofitable to attempt to teach the native tongue to the commercial, technical and agricultural experts we send to Asian countries. Their tours of duty are over before even the most industrious of them could benefit from bi-lingual ability.

The dilemma can be stated as follows: The American technicians whose knowledge and services are most valuable abroad are unwilling, for understandable reasons, to spend more than a few years in any one "backward" country. Very few of them are either willing or have the time or capacity to devote themselves to the intensive study required to learn the native language.

The dilemma is somewhat different in the career foreign service. When the State Department spends two years to train a career officer to speak the language of a certain country, it naturally expects that officer to spend a good part of his future career in that country in order to reap the benefits of his training. Most promising officers are reluctant to commit themselves to spending up to half their careers in Sarkhan, with the result that the quality of language trainees for the less desirable places may suffer.

The authors of *The Ugly American* seem to assume that Americans serving abroad have only to live in the villages and speak the native tongue and all will be well for democracy in Asia. It would take an entire issue of *The New Republic* to examine fully the fallacies in this viewpoint. One comment: Thousands of American missionaries in China over several generations lived in this way, with results all too familiar to us.

More important than the need to speak the native tongue is the quality of the Americans we send abroad. Probably the best known and most respected American in Asia since the end of World War II—the man who has contributed most to American prestige among Asians—is Wolf Ladejinsky, the land reform expert. Ladejinsky has served in India, Japan and Viet Nam, in each country introducing sweeping reforms in the system of land tenure. His contributions have not been lessened by the fact that he speaks none of the languages of these countries.

If it were true, as *The Ugly American* argues, that Americans are being outwitted all over Asia by diabolically clever Communist agents who speak the native language and live like natives, then surely Viet Nam after Dien Bien Phu was the ideal place to prove it. Ho Chi Minh was then at the height of his prestige as a nationalist leader after having driven out the French. Thousands of trained Communist agents of the Viet Minh infiltrated into South Viet Nam, lived with the villagers, spread communist gospel in the native tongue. Arrayed against them was a weak, disorganized South Vietnamese government under an untried leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a small American diplomatic mission and military advisory group, not one of whom spoke Vietnamese. What happened is history. The Communist agents failed utterly to subvert the population, and the government of Ngo Dinh Diem has become one of our staunchest allies in Asia.

This is not to argue that it is not a good idea for Americans serving their government abroad to speak the native language and get to know the inhabitants better. Both are praiseworthy objectives, but the benefits of achieving them and the penalties of failing to achieve them are far less than the authors of *The Ugly American* would have us believe.

Finally, since the book pretends to be semi-documentary, a grave protest must be registered in the interests of accuracy and fairness at the caricature of foreign service officers which appear in it. The incidents in which they appear and their attitudes during those incidents are completely unrepresentative of the true character of the service and its career officers, who are a group of men and women of whom this country has good reason to be proud.

ALLEN TAYLOR

New York, N. Y.

► *Southerners and Schools*

SIRS:

I DESIRE to express my compliments for the thoughtful and informative series on school integration in the South, written by Helen Fuller under the title "Southerners and Schools."

Because there has been so much vehemence and invective on this subject, I regard Miss Fuller's articles as a particular public service, since they are thoughtful, moderate and fair. What we need on this question is information and not epithets. That is why I regard Miss Fuller's contribution so highly.

RICHARD L. NEUBERGER

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

► *Great Minds on Censorship*

SIRS:

As corollary to Mr. Pierson's thoughtful articles on television censorship (*NR*, March 23, March 30) it would be useful to recall what two great minds thought of censorship in general.

Bernard Shaw said:

> All censorships exist to prevent anyone from challenging current conceptions and existing institutions. All progress is initiated by challenging current conceptions, and executed by supplanting existing institutions. Consequently, the first condition of progress is the removal of censorships.

Eugene O'Neill wrote:

> Censorship of anything, at any time, in any place, on whatever pretense, has always been and always will be the last cowardly resort of the boob and the bigot!

ORVIS ROSS

Rochester, Minn.

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